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      PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-1206 
___________ 
 
GEORGE WILLIAM BLOOD, 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN B. A. BLEDSOE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 10-00141) 
District Judge:  Honorable Richard P. Conaboy 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 11, 2011 
Before:  RENDELL, FUENTES and SMITH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 12, 2011) 
 
George William Blood 
Appellant Pro se 
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Stephen R. Cerutti, II 
Mark E. Morrison 
Office of United States Attorney  
228 Walnut Street, P.O. Box 11754 
220 Federal Building and Courthouse 
Harrisburg, PA 17108-0000 
Counsel for Appellee 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
George William Blood, a prisoner incarcerated at the 
Federal Prison Camp in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, appeals pro 
se from the District Court‟s denial of his habeas petition.  
Blood contends that the federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) 
miscalculated the aggregate term for his two federal sentences 
and failed to award him credit due under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).  
For the following reasons, we will affirm. 
I. 
 On February 9, 2004, Blood reported to the Federal 
Prison Camp in Lewisburg to serve a 60-month term of 
imprisonment imposed by the Middle District of Tennessee 
on two convictions for possession of forged securities.  While 
serving that sentence, he was charged and convicted of 
unrelated offenses in the District of Delaware.  Before the 
Delaware court could sentence Blood, the United States Court 
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of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated his Tennessee 
sentence in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 
(2005).  See United States v. Blood, 435 F.3d 612, 616 (6th 
Cir. 2006). 
At a March 13, 2006 sentencing hearing on the 
Delaware convictions, the Delaware court stated: 
I recognize that by circumstances that are 
entirely fortuitous . . . not in my control, your 
sentence in the Middle District of Tennessee 
has been vacated and that case has been 
remanded for resentencing.  So the time you 
served to date will be credited to this 
conviction, so whatever I give you, you have 
already served a couple years on and it will be 
to up to a judge [in Tennessee] to decide 
whether or not the sentence you receive for 
[your Tennessee convictions] is to be 
consecutive to the sentence that I give or 
concurrent with it. 
(Habeas Pet. Ex. G-3.)  The Delaware court then imposed a 
sentence of 78 months of imprisonment.  On August 14, 
2006, the Tennessee court resentenced Blood to 51 months of 
imprisonment to be served concurrently with his Delaware 
sentence. 
 After his Tennessee sentence was imposed, the BOP 
calculated Blood‟s total term of incarceration.  It considered 
the Tennessee sentence to have commenced on February 9, 
2004 – the date Blood began serving on the original, vacated 
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Tennessee sentence – and the Delaware sentence to have 
commenced on the day it was imposed, March 13, 2006.  The 
BOP then aggregated the two sentences such that only about 
half of the Tennessee sentence overlapped with the Delaware 
sentence, resulting in a combined total term of 103 months 
and 4 days.  In other words, the BOP considered the 25 
months and 4 days that Blood served prior to the imposition 
of the Delaware sentence to count solely toward the 
Tennessee sentence.  After crediting him for seven days spent 
in custody after his initial Tennessee arrest, the BOP 
calculated Blood‟s full term date to be September 5, 2012.  
His projected release date with good time credit is July 29, 
2011.   
After exhausting his administrative remedies, Blood 
filed a habeas petition in the District Court, pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2241.  He argued that the BOP failed to credit the 25 
months and 11 days he served pursuant to his vacated 
Tennessee sentence (the “disputed time”)1 toward his 
Delaware sentence.  According to Blood, if the BOP had 
calculated his sentence correctly, he would have been 
released well over a year ago after accounting for good time 
credit.  The case was referred to a Magistrate Judge who 
recommended denying the petition.  Blood objected to the 
Magistrate Judge‟s Report and Recommendation (R&R), but 
the District Court overruled his objections and denied the 
                                                 
1
 That time is comprised of the seven days Blood spent in custody 
after his arrest plus the time he spent incarcerated between 
February 9, 2004, when he reported for service of the Tennessee 
sentence, and March 13, 2006, when he was sentenced on the 
Delaware convictions. 
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petition.   
Blood timely appealed.
2
  We ordered expedited 
briefing in light of his impending release.  Specifically, we 
asked the parties to address the possibility that the BOP‟s 
sentencing manual was internally inconsistent, as discussed 
further below. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction over Blood‟s 
habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  See Woodall v. 
Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 242 (3d Cir. 2005).  
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the 
District Court‟s denial of Blood‟s habeas petition de novo.  
                                                 
2
 After the Magistrate Judge issued the R&R, Blood filed a petition 
for a writ of mandamus in this Court, requesting immediate 
release. We concluded that mandamus relief was inappropriate but 
noted that we might consider a renewed petition if the District 
Court failed to timely rule on Blood‟s objections to the R&R.  
Once the District Court ruled on his objections, Blood filed a 
“renewal petition” with this Court, which the Clerk forwarded to 
the District Court to be docketed as a notice of appeal.  Blood 
thereafter submitted a letter, which we will construe as a motion 
that we take judicial notice of the submissions he filed in 
connection with his prior petition, and a letter motion objecting to 
any recharacterization of his “renewal” as a notice of appeal.  We 
will deny those motions.  Blood‟s “renewal petition” is most 
appropriately treated as a notice of appeal because it seeks review 
of the District Court‟s judgment.  And since his prior submissions 
duplicate the record submitted in connection with the instant 
appeal, there is no need for us to take judicial notice of them. 
6 
 
See Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2007).    
III. 
Blood contends that the BOP disregarded the Delaware 
court‟s intention to credit the disputed time toward his 
Delaware sentence.  We, however, agree with the District 
Court that the Delaware court‟s statement, “the time you 
[Blood] served to date will be credited to this conviction,” 
when read in context, merely reflects the Delaware court‟s 
prediction that the BOP would credit the disputed time toward 
the Delaware sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).  See 
Ruggiano v. Reish, 307 F.3d 121, 134 (3d Cir. 2002) (“In 
interpreting the oral statement [of a sentencing judge], we 
have recognized that the context in which this statement is 
made is essential.”), superseded on other grounds by, 
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c) app. Note 3(E) (2003).  Indeed, the 
Delaware court explained that any such credit resulted from 
“circumstances that are entirely fortuitous, . . . not in [the 
court‟s] control,” namely, the Sixth Circuit remand.  Then, 
the Delaware court transitioned from the topic of credit by 
stating, “for what is before me, though, this is the sentence 
that I intend to impose . . . ,” thereby segmenting the court‟s 
intended sentence from its discussion of credit.   
Furthermore, district courts have no authority to credit 
time toward a sentence under § 3585(b) – that function rests 
in the sole authority of the BOP.
3
  See United States v. 
                                                 
3
 The BOP could have credited the disputed time toward the 
Delaware sentence, provided the time was not also credited toward 
the Tennessee sentence, because Blood was arrested for the 
7 
 
Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333-35 (1992).  We believe that if the 
Delaware court intended to fashion a sentence that would 
effectively “credit” Blood with the disputed time, it would 
have explicitly granted a downward departure in accordance 
with § 5G1.3(c) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines.
4
     
Our conclusion that the Delaware court lacked any 
specific intent vis-à-vis the disputed time, however, does not 
answer whether the BOP properly calculated Blood‟s 
sentence.  Blood contends that because the original Tennessee 
sentence was vacated on appeal, his post-remand Tennessee 
                                                                                                             
Tennessee charges in 2002, after he committed the Delaware 
offenses in 2000.  See § 3585(b)(2) (requiring credit for time 
served “as a result of any other charge for which the defendant was 
arrested after the commission of the offense for which the sentence 
was imposed”).  That appears to be the calculation the Delaware 
court envisioned. 
4
 In Ruggiano, upon which Blood relies, we authorized district 
courts to grant credit for time served on a prior undischarged term 
of imprisonment under § 5G1.3(c).  307 F.3d at 131.  However, § 
5G1.3 was amended in 2003 to clarify that subsection (c) does not 
authorize such an adjustment unless the court grants a downward 
departure.  See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 app. note 3(E).  That amendment 
was in effect in 2006, when the Delaware court sentenced Blood, 
and we believe that if the Delaware court had intended to invoke 
the provision, it would have indicated as much.  See id. (“To avoid 
confusion with the [BOP‟s] exclusive authority provided under 18 
U.S.C. § 3585(b) to grant credit for time served under certain 
circumstances, the Commission recommends that any downward 
departure under this application note be clearly stated in the 
Judgment in a Criminal Case Order as a downward departure 
pursuant to § 5G1.3(c) . . . .”). 
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sentence could not have commenced until he was resentenced 
on August 14, 2006.  And since neither the original nor the 
post-remand Tennessee sentence was in effect at the time he 
was sentenced by the Delaware court, Blood argues that the 
BOP was required to credit the disputed time toward his 
Delaware sentence – despite the fact that he would inevitably 
be resentenced on the Tennessee convictions – because there 
was no other federal sentence to which it could be credited.  
The BOP contends that it correctly treated Blood‟s Tennessee 
sentence as commencing on February 9, 2004, in accordance 
with its internal sentencing manual, Program Statement 
5880.28, because the underlying convictions were never 
vacated and his post-remand Tennessee sentence essentially 
modified the original sentence.  Accordingly, contends the 
BOP, Blood served the disputed time on the Tennessee 
sentence and is not entitled to double credit that time toward 
the Delaware sentence.   
In calculating a federal sentence, the BOP first 
determines when the sentence commenced and then 
determines whether the prisoner is entitled to any credits 
toward his sentence.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3585.  Section 3585(a) 
states that “[a] sentence to a term of imprisonment 
commences on the date the defendant is received in custody 
awaiting transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to commence 
service of sentence at, the official detention facility at which 
the sentence is to be served.”  Pursuant to § 3585(b), a 
prisoner is entitled to credit for time served prior to the date 
the sentence commences “(1) as a result of the offense for 
which the sentence was imposed; or (2) as a result of any 
other charge for which the defendant was arrested after the 
commission of the offense for which the sentence was 
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imposed[,]” so long as the time has not been credited toward 
another sentence.  When a prisoner is serving multiple 
sentences, the BOP must combine those sentences to form a 
single aggregate term.  18 U.S.C. § 3584(c).
5
   
Section 3585 does not directly address the 
recalculation of sentences post-remand.  However, the BOP 
has interpreted § 3585 in its internal sentencing manual, 
Program Statement 5880.28.  The BOP‟s interpretation 
warrants “some deference” so long as it sets forth a 
permissible construction of the statute.  See Reno v. Koray, 
515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995).  According to that manual, “[i]n no 
case can a federal sentence of imprisonment commence [in 
accordance with § 3585(a)] earlier than the date on which it is 
imposed.”  See BOP Program Statement 5880.28, Sentence 
Computation Manual (July 20, 1999) available at 
http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5880_028.pdf, at 1-13.  
However, a portion of the manual interpreting § 3585(b) 
provides that “[t]ime spent serving another . . . sentence that 
is vacated merely for resentencing shall not have any effect 
on [a] sentence computation until such time as the inmate is 
resentenced.”  Id. at 1-17.  In such cases, “the date the 
sentence [imposed on remand] begins will be the same as the 
original computation,” id. at 1-18, such that time served on 
the original sentence is treated as time served on the post-
remand sentence.  Id. at 1-17.  Because the manual appears to 
prohibit treating a sentence as commencing prior to the date 
                                                 
5
 To the extent Blood suggests that the BOP failed to comply with 
18 U.S.C. § 3584(c), we disagree.  The issue is not whether the 
BOP aggregated Blood‟s sentences– it did – but rather, whether the 
BOP correctly calculated the sentences in accordance with § 3585. 
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of imposition, yet treats a post-remand sentence as having 
commenced on the date of the original, vacated sentence, we 
asked the parties to address that apparent inconsistency. 
The BOP explains that the two provisions can be 
harmonized by understanding how they work together in 
context.  Program Statement 5880.28, like § 3585(a), focuses 
on the date that a prisoner physically reports to the BOP for 
service of a federal sentence on a given conviction.  When a 
federal sentence is vacated without disturbing its underlying 
conviction, the BOP – using a “conviction based” as opposed 
to a “sentence based” approach – treats the post-remand 
sentence as commencing on the same date as the original 
sentence.  That is because, practically speaking, “[a] 
resentencing does not change the date a defendant actually 
physically appeared and commenced service of a term of 
imprisonment resulting from a particular conviction.”6  
(Appellee‟s Br. 25.)  Blood, however, contends that Program 
Statement 5880.28 is “contrary to law,” because “it is 
physically and legally impossible for a federal sentence of 
imprisonment to „commence‟ prior to the date a sentence of 
imprisonment is „imposed by the court.‟”  (Appellant‟s Br. 9.)  
                                                 
6
 In contrast, when a defendant serves time on a sentence for a 
conviction that has been vacated on appeal, but the defendant is 
resentenced after a retrial, the BOP does not treat the new sentence 
as a modification of the former, vacated sentence.  In that case, the 
defendant‟s term of imprisonment commences on the date he was 
sentenced after retrial, and any time spent in custody on the 
vacated convictions is credited pursuant to § 3585(b).  Program 
Statement 5880.28 at 1-18.    
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We conclude that Program Statement 5880.28 is a 
permissible interpretation of § 3585, and that it therefore 
warrants deference.  See Allen v. Crabtree, 153 F.3d 1030, 
1033 (9th Cir. 1998).
7
  We have found nothing in the law that 
prohibits the BOP from treating Blood‟s post-remand 
Tennessee sentence as commencing on the date the original 
sentence was imposed, nor compels the calculation Blood 
proposes.  Furthermore, we think it is reasonable for the BOP, 
from an administrative standpoint, to treat a sentence imposed 
on remand as a continuation of an initial sentence when the 
initial sentence has been vacated, but the underlying 
convictions are undisturbed.  In such cases, there can be no 
question that the prisoner continues to serve time on the intact 
convictions despite the need for resentencing.   
Certainly, it would be preferable if the language in 
Program Statement 5880.28 did not appear to be inconsistent.  
That the manual could be clearer, however, does not change 
our conclusion that the BOP‟s framework is a legitimate 
exercise of its authority.  To conclude otherwise would lead 
to absurd results.  Instead of the predictable regime 
established by Program Statement 5880.28, Blood‟s proposed 
method of calculation would result in a windfall to some 
inmates serving multiple sentences (such as himself) while 
                                                 
7
 Although the court in Allen should not have deferred to Policy 
Statement 5880.28 under Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), because Policy Statement 
5880.28 is only an internal agency guideline, see Tablada v. 
Thomas, 533 F.3d 800, 806 (9th Cir. 2008); Stiver v. Meko, 130 
F.3d 574, 578 (3d Cir. 1997), we agree with its conclusion even 
under the appropriate, less deferential standard. 
12 
 
other inmates would end up serving a longer aggregate term 
despite obtaining a reduced sentence after a successful appeal.  
That is an illogical result that we will not require.   
In sum, the BOP appropriately treated Blood‟s 
Tennessee sentence as commencing on February 9, 2004, 
consistent with Policy Statement 5880.28.
8
  Accordingly, the 
disputed time was served on the Tennessee sentence.  Since § 
3585(b) prohibits double crediting, Blood is not also entitled 
to have the disputed time counted toward his Delaware 
sentence.  See Wilson, 503 U.S. at 337 (“Congress made clear 
[in § 3585(b)] that a defendant could not receive a double 
credit for his detention time.”).  Because Blood is not entitled 
to the relief he seeks in his habeas petition, we will affirm the 
District Court‟s judgment.9 
 
                                                 
8
 Our result is consistent with the Sixth Circuit‟s treatment of 
Blood‟s aggregate sentence.  The Sixth Circuit dismissed as moot 
Blood‟s appeal of his 51-month Tennessee sentence because he 
began serving that sentence on February 9, 2004, and had 
completed his service by the time the case was ready for review.  
United States v. Blood, 259 F. App‟x 712, 713 (6th Cir. 2007).   
9
 In light of our disposition, we will deny Blood‟s motion for 
immediate release and his “motion for summary affirmance.”  
